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This article analyzes factors relating to moderation and immoderation of 
post-rebel parties in power, thus making a significant departure from pre-
vious studies, which have tended to examine these from a position of political 
weakness. The rigorous analysis marries approaches and findings from com-
parative politics and Middle East studies with a view to making an original, 
qualitative contribution to the academic debate on the inclusion of Islamist 
parties in formal politics based on lessons learned from the experiences of 12 
post-rebel parties across the globe, thus also breaking with the trend for sin-
gle-country case studies or larger, quantitative studies. The research finds that 
whether post-rebel parties in power are likely to behave moderately largely 
depends upon the political environment at the time of the conflict’s end, i.e., 
when these parties first gain entry into the formal political system. Post-rebel 
parties entering a political system with a tradition of resolving political disa-
greements within the electoral arena, in which the post-rebel party faces riva-
lry from sizeable competitors, and where the main issue driving the post-rebel 
party’s support during the conflict is no longer salient, are more likely to be-
have inclusively and remain moderate once in power. With reference to Is-
lamist parties, the issue thus becomes a question of how to best create an en-
vironment that facilitates Islamist moderation upon these parties’ inclusion 
into formal politics, rather than a debate over whether the inclusion or exclu-
sion of such parties will lead to their moderation. This finding is likely to sig-
nificantly change how scholars approach Islamist parties and their inclusion 
into formal politics. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades, scholars of various disciplines, most notably Middle East 
politics and terrorism studies, have sought to establish a conceptual framework 
detailing what constitutes political moderation of radical parties—and in partic-
ular of Islamist parties—which is one of the last groups of parties to be allowed 
entry into contemporary political systems, yet which remains understudied 
within the field of party politics (Rivetti & Kraetzschmar, 2018). A substantial 
part of the scholarly debate has centred on whether the manifestation of mod-
eration should primarily be observed in the form of expressed change of ideolo-
gy, such as e.g., an official declaration of the abandoning of the use of violent 
methods, and/or in the form of behavioural change (Clark, 2006; Karakaya & 
Yildirim, 2013; Schwedler, 2011). With regard to the latter, a further issue under 
contestation is the level of observation, that is, whether behavioural change is 
best observed at the level of individuals or the party as a collective and, further-
more, whether the focus of enquiry ought to be the party members or the party 
leadership, i.e., the more elite level (Ashour, 2011; Wickham, 2013). 
While touching upon behavioural impact, this article is primarily concerned 
with systemic (environmental) impact, arguing that party moderation is princi-
pally determined by the political context. The article raises the fundamental 
question of under which environmental conditions are the risk of Islamist do-
mination and related immoderation minimized when opening up the political 
system, focusing on a very specific set of actors, namely post-rebel parties in 
power in the era from 1990 onwards, i.e., with the onset in earnest of the third 
wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) and the sudden and sharp increase 
in post-rebel party formation (Manning & Smith, 2019). The article makes a sig-
nificant contribution to the field by moving away from the traditional debate on 
radicalization and deradicalization with a view to refocusing—and thus change—the 
stalled discussion of Islamist inclusion and moderation with the objective of 
learning lessons from post-rebel parties, which in many instances are also de-
fined as radical, yet are only infrequently discussed in analyses of Islamist parties 
as a consequence of the reality that the former tend to be located outside of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The analysis here consequently centres 
on entities that have made the transition from armed movements to political 
parties, the latter defined along the lines of Sartori’s (1976: p. 63) classic work as 
“any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and 
is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public 
office”. Following this definition, a party can still have an armed wing and does 
not have to renounce violence, but it must obtain government power within the 
electoral process in order to qualify (Janda, 1993). Thus, unlike most studies on 
the topic, this article also covers what is often described as hybrid organizations 
that operate both as political movements and militant groups (Berti, 2013). 
In a further departure from the baseline of many studies, most notably Hun-
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olence are not necessarily defined as what Kirdiş (2018) has termed “immode-
rate”, i.e., the antithesis to moderate. These parties could potentially be ideolog-
ically radical, yet behaviourally moderate or vice versa, which is one of the rea-
sons why the term post-rebel parties as opposed to radical, fundamentalist or 
anti-establishment parties are used here. The article seeks to highlight the reality 
that the parties in question are not viewed as radical by everyone, nor are all 
fundamentalist parties radical (Clark & Schwedler, 2003; Schwedler, 2011). Fur-
thermore, post-rebel parties are also not necessarily anti-establishment. Some of 
these parties sought to become part of the establishment during their rebel years 
and prior, but were excluded from electoral processes. Others sought to become 
the new establishment by ousting the former elite, thus leading to their exclusion 
from formal politics before some eventually succeeded. The elite—or establish-
ment—they fought against was at times indigenous, but in some cases, it took 
the form of an external (sometimes colonial) power.  
Within the context of post-rebel parties and moderation, the study of such 
parties in power is a relatively new avenue of research. So far, the debate on 
moderation has almost exclusively focused on so-called radical parties either on 
the cusp of gaining entry into formal politics or on post-rebel parties already al-
lowed in, but finding themselves in a position of weakness. This article analyzes 
post-rebel parties in a position of strength and consequently sheds light on an 
area that is currently under-studied. Parties that are in power and thus often set 
the rules themselves, rather than having to moderate to abide by the rules as 
dictated by other, more powerful, actors. Hence, although moderation is still 
seen as governed by calculations relating to pluralism, incentives (rewards) and 
risk as per standard moderation theory (Schwedler, 2011), the parameters of 
change are different under these circumstances. Moderation is accordingly not 
defined as a party becoming less ideologically radical in terms of the left-right 
political spectrum (or, indeed, more advanced multi-dimensional models). Ra-
ther, as the actors here determine the rules, the emphasis is on moderation in 
terms of allowing and affording meaningful political pluralism in practice, i.e., 
political space1. Thus, the article constitutes a significant and original contribu-
tion to the conceptual debate with particular emphasis on making headway on 
the behavioural side of the discussion at the level of the party as a whole, i.e., the 
collective, although given the personalistic nature of a number of the parties at 
the core of the analysis, party moderation at the collective level may, in practice, 
be down to the decisions of individual party leaders. 
2. From Post-Rebel Parties to Islamist Inclusion and  
Moderation 
Within the disciplines of Middle East politics and terrorism studies, the debate 
on moderation has largely centred on Islamist entities due to their habitual ex-
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clusion from formal politics for most of the post-independence era2. Scholars 
such as Ashour (2009, 2011), Bayat (2007), Browers (2009), Clark (2006), Norton 
(1995), Schwedler (2007, 2011, 2013) and Wickham (2004, 2013) have all pro-
vided important insights into the workings of and systemic effects upon Islamist 
parties by way of their inclusion/exclusion from formal politics, i.e., contributing 
to what has been termed the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis”. The inclu-
sion-moderation hypothesis fundamentally seeks to explain the behaviour, ide-
ology and strategies of Islamist movements and parties, the basic assumption 
being that the integration of such radical/anti-establishment parties into formal 
(pluralist, but not necessarily democratic) politics will lead to change in the form 
of moderation of these actors. The focus is, in other words, on change related to 
the formerly excluded actors, rather than the system more broadly, emphasizing 
the risk calculations and choices made by the parties in question on the basis of 
incentives and opportunities offered by the institutional framework in place. 
The inclusion-moderation hypothesis is not without its critics, however. 
Scholars such as Cavatorta and Merone (2013) have argued quite the opposite, 
namely that exclusion can lead to moderation and thus does not necessarily re-
sult in radicalization, whilst others have highlighted problems such as e.g., the 
reality that the inclusion-moderation hypothesis assumes that the concept of 
moderation is uncontested amongst scholars, and the reality that it adopts a 
mechanical and linear approach to change (Al-Anani, 2019; Karakaya & Yildi-
rim, 2013; Kirdiş, 2018; Pahwa, 2017). Finally, scholars have pointed out that Is-
lamist inclusion does not necessarily result in moderation, nor does it inevitably 
give rise to democratization (Wegner & Pellicer, 2009).  
At present, the schism between academics who either subscribe to the merits 
of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis or see it as fundamentally flawed has led 
to a situation where debate has effectively ceased to exist, with the two sides 
talking past each other and addressing different audiences. This article is an at-
tempt at reigniting the debate by refocusing and reorienting, learning lessons 
from the behaviour and experiences of other parties further afield, which were 
formerly excluded due to what was deemed their radical nature, i.e., their cate-
gorization as rebels. In other words, there is a clear affinity between Islamist par-
ties and post-rebel parties in terms of their outsider status, but there are also 
other similarities. In many instances, post-rebel parties and Islamist parties are 
located in unstable environments on the verge of violent conflict, often as a re-
sult of weak, fragile states3 marred by civil war, or they are found in authorita-
 
 
2Much of the work on party moderation in the Middle Eastern context traces its theoretical roots 
back to studies of formerly excluded socialist and Christian formations that made the transforma-
tion into political parties and gained access to the formal political system in Europe and Latin 
America (Schwedler, 2011). For a thought provoking and recent comparative analysis of the mod-
eration of Islamist and communist parties, please see Karakaya and Yildirim (2013). Please note that 
within the field of Middle East politics there have also been contributions of a broader nature, i.e., 
concerned with the effects of inclusion and exclusion beyond Islamist entities. See, among others, 
Anderson (1997), Ibrahim (1980), Krämer (1994) and Moussalli (1999). 
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rian states where power is largely rooted outside of the electoral arena (Boege, 
Brown, & Clements, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2006, 2013; van de 
Walle, 2003). In both types of settings, politics is viewed as a zero-sum game and 
post-rebel parties and Islamist parties have consequently been categorized as 
radical or, rather, a threat to the incumbent regime as they have sought to estab-
lish themselves as alternatives. Furthermore, both have been assumed to poten-
tially constitute significant political rivals should they be offered the opportunity 
to enter the formal political system and contest elections on an equal footing 
with other parties, the post-rebel parties qua their leading role during the con-
flict situation, and the Islamist parties on the basis of their extensive, institu-
tionalized networks as well as opposition credentials, which were reinforced by 
the parties’ exclusion from formal politics. Hence, these parties—Islamist and 
post-rebel—were anticipated to be entering the political system from a position 
of strength, a reality which in the case of the Islamist parties has led to their ex-
clusion from formal politics even in the wake of the introduction of competi-
tive authoritarianism across large parts of the MENA in recent decades (Cava-
torta & Storm, 2018; Cavatorta, Storm, & Resta, 2020; Rivetti & Kraetzschmar, 
2018). 
It is exactly this position of strength, which has preoccupied the thoughts of 
incumbent regimes and scholars alike, the former in terms of concerns relating 
to regime survival, i.e., maintaining their own position of power, and the latter 
with democratization and security issues in mind. As already mentioned, within 
the disciplines of security studies and Middle East politics, these concerns have 
given rise to a body of work focusing on Islamist moderation via incentives and 
what the associated risks to democracy and democratization processes are, i.e., 
what Huntington (1991: pp. 165-174) terms the “participation/moderation 
trade-off”. With regard to the scholarship on post-rebel parties, the preoccupa-
tion with security and democracy has resulted in two sets of literature, the first 
on the transformation of rebel groups into political parties (Acosta, 2014; 
Ishiyama & Batta, 2011; Kovacs, 2007; Kovacs & Hatz, 2016; Manning, 2007; 
Matanock, 2017; Sindre, 2016a, 2016b), and the second on the impact of such 
transformation on party system development, democratization and peace (Ishiya-
ma, 2015; Lyons, 2016; Rudloff & Findley, 2016; Suazo, 2013). For the most part, 
and especially during the early years, academics placed particular emphasis on 
factors relating to the organizational capacities of post-rebel parties during con-
flict and in the subsequent period of transition, although the study of the institu-
tional environment has been steadily growing in line with the expansion of re-
search on the impact of party change.  
A recent contribution to the debate by Manning and Smith (2019: p. 417) ex-
plores both organizational and environmental factors in a comparative fashion 
within the parameters of legislative elections. The analysis centres on the 
risk-reward ratio “or party leaders contemplating whether and how much to in-
vest in adapting their party’s ideological appeals, collective identity or organiza-
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working on the basis of the core assumption that parties will only change if 
forced to do so, either because their own survival or their primary goals are 
threatened. Like this study, Manning and Smith (2019) are thus concerned with 
post-rebel parties that have already entered into formal electoral politics at the 
national level, but the authors do not distinguish between post-rebel parties in a 
position of strength and those that enter formal politics from a position of 
weakness given that qua their focus they equate success with the attainment of 
seats. In contrast to Manning and Smith (2019), who focus on electoral beha-
viour and post-rebel party change, a recent study by Kirdiş (2018) provides im-
portant insights into the conditions under which incumbent Islamist parties res-
ist moderation in terms of affording political space. Accordingly, Kirdiş (2018) 
explicitly emphasizes strength in her analysis of party change, which centres on 
the role of internal factors, most notably the lack of willingness to compromise, a 
sense of moral superiority, and the virtual absence of internal pluralism4. 
Echoing the base premise of Manning and Smith (2019) despite their differing 
foci, Kirdiş (2018) underlines the importance of necessity when it comes to party 
change, i.e., that incumbent Islamist parties in the MENA did not moderate be-
cause they did not need to as they already dominated the party system.  
Combining the main findings and theoretical undercurrents of Manning and 
Smith (2019) and Kirdiş (2018), with a view to both complement and build upon 
their work, this article centres its analysis on post-rebel parties that performed 
well in national elections and secured government power, thus taking charge of 
decision-making at the highest level, either as the sole governing party or as the 
leading party in a ruling coalition5. It consequently explores the environmental 
conditions under which these parties obtained and maintained power, where 
Kirdiş (2018) focuses on the internal and organizational side, whilst also going 
beyond the legislative arena and, therefore, the scope of Manning and Smith 
(2019) by including the presidency and other avenues of power. The objective is 
to learn lessons from the effects of the political environment upon the behaviour 
of post-rebel parties in power, which can then be applied when discussing the 
inclusion into formal politics and the prospects for moderation of Islamist par-
ties, whether rebel, post-rebel or simply currently excluded. Because, as the data 
examined here suggests, contrary to the findings of Manning and Smith (2019) 
as well as the basic tenet of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, it is not the 
timing of national elections, leadership continuity, or inclusion into the formal 
political system that make post-rebel parties more likely to moderate or, indeed, 
resist moderation, at least not beyond the electoral arena. Rather, whether a 
post-rebel party chooses to moderate largely depends on the risk-reward ratio 
relating to the constellations of power within a particular state, most notably at 
 
 
4Similar observations have been made by Lyons (2016) with reference to post-rebel parties in power 
in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda. 
5Schwedler (2011) argues that electoral participation alone is insufficient as an indicator of modera-
tion as parties might still harbour a political agenda that is anything but moderate, i.e., such a move 
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the point of entry of the post-rebel party into formal politics6. In other words, 
party moderation is principally—albeit not exclusively—determined by the po-
litical context.  
The following sections explore issues relating to the fundamental research 
question posed here, namely under which environmental conditions is the risk 
of Islamist domination and related immoderation minimized when opening up 
the political system? Section 3 centres on electoral participation and the perfor-
mance of post-rebel parties at the polls, examining the state of the art of the lite-
rature, whilst section 4 builds on these findings and offers a critique from the 
perspective of post-rebel parties in power as their success is determined by fac-
tors that go beyond the electoral arena. Furthermore, section 4 puts forward the 
argument that an assessment of how post-rebel parties behave once in power 
must necessarily include an analysis of political space, as dominance is often or-
chestrated and displayed outside of the electoral arena. Finally, section 5 offers 
up a discussion and analysis of the implications for the inclusion into formal 
politics of Islamist parties on the basis of the conclusions reached in sections 3 
and 4, highlighting in particular how the focus of the debate ought to shift from 
a discussion of whether Islamist parties can be included without posing a risk to 
democracy to a debate on how best to facilitate an environment that minimizes 
the risk upon their inclusion. In short, the article concludes that based on the 
lessons learned from post-rebel parties in power elsewhere, the focus should be 
on the environment, not the individual Islamist actors. 
3. Post-Rebel Party Success at the Polls and the Issue of  
Political Space 
To explore how different factors, most of them environmental, affect the politi-
cal moderation of formerly excluded parties entering the political system in a 
position of strength, the articles makes use of qualitative data relating to 
post-rebel parties that came to power following their transition from rebel 
movement to political parties. The case selection was made on the basis of the 
above-mentioned recent study of the electoral performance by post-rebel parties 
by Manning and Smith (2019), who identified 77 such parties competing in na-
tional legislative elections between 1990 and 20097. From this study, 12 cases (see 
Table 1) were selected for inclusion in the analysis, based on the criterion that 
the post-rebel party must have won a legislative election and formed government 
at the national level at least once since entering formal politics. Given the objec-
tive of learning lessons from other contexts with a view to refocus the discussion 
of Islamist inclusion, no Islamist parties were amongst the selected cases.  
 
 
6The structure of competition, i.e., electoral systems, presidentialism and territorial arrangements, 
has been found to influence party success generally, that is, beyond post-rebel parties (Lijphart, 
1977; Shugart & Carey, 1992). 
7A similar approach was taken by Ishiyama (2019), highlighting the ground breaking nature of 
Manning and Smith’s (2019) study, which stands out within the field as there has so far been very 
little quantitative comparative work published on rebel party transformation and the political suc-





DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2020.104038 645 Open Journal of Political Science 
 
Table 1. Case selection: post-rebel parties in power. 
Party acronym Party name Country Region 
ANC African National Congress South Africa Africa 
CNDD-FDD 
Conseil National pour la Défense  
de la Démocratie 
Burundi Africa 
CPN(M) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) Nepal Asia 
FMLN 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la  
Liberación Nacional El Salvador Latin America 
FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste East Timor Southeast Asia 
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Croatia Balkans 
MPS Mouvement Patriotique du Salut Chad Africa 
NRM 
National Resistance Movement  
(Harakati za Upinzani za Kitaifa) 
Uganda Africa 
PCT Parti Congolais du Travail Congo Brazzaville Africa 
PDK Partia Demokratike e Kosovës Kosovo Balkans 
PPRD 
Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction  
et la Démocratie 
DR Congo Africa 
RPF Front Patriotique Rwandais (Inkotanyi) Rwanda Africa 
 
Taken together, the 12 cases cover a range of orientations, locations and con-
texts, spanning the left-right spectrum, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the Balkans 
and Latin America, and states teetering on the brink of violent conflict, stable 
states, democracies with multiparty systems, as well as authoritarian regimes 
with predominant party systems. The cases thus bring a wealth of experiences to 
the table, enabling us to chart whether Islamist parties once included into formal 
politics are likely to moderate and which conditions best facilitate moderation or 
bolster against immoderation, with the obvious caveat that, given the qualitative 
nature of the enquiry, while the findings are relevant to the cases included in the 
analysis, they are not statistically sound. That is not, of course, to say that pat-
terns cannot be detected nor that the results bear no relevance to other 
post-rebel parties in government or, indeed, to post-rebel parties on the cusp of 
such power. 
A Note on Theory: Party Adaptation beyond Representation 
While there are clear similarities between the post-rebel parties in power and Is-
lamist parties in the MENA as argued previously, the jump made from the study 
of the moderation of the former to the moderation of the latter is not without 
difficulties. This reality is largely related to the character of the research done on 
either set of parties so far, most notably the foci of such. As already discussed, 
the study of Islamist inclusion has tended to focus on the incentives for such 
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risk to pluralist politics, while research on post-rebel parties has long centred on 
organizational factors, and particularly capabilities, although recent forays into 
analyses of the institutional environment have emphasized the electoral arena, 
frequently equating political success to electoral success, i.e., representation, al-
though in some cases this is expanded to inclusion into the executive and, thus, 
access to patronage resources (Ishiyama, 2019). Consequently, when discussing 
moderation within this context, the emphasis is on factors that impact upon the 
likelihood that post-rebel parties will adapt with a view to attract voters (and 
coalition partners), whilst keeping in mind that parties will only change if forced 
to do so (Ishiyama, 2019; Kirdiş, 2018; Manning & Smith, 2019). 
But political success and, ultimately, power, goes beyond parliamentary seats. 
Even if focusing narrowly on the electoral arena, political power is often rooted 
in the executive and, at times, in seats won at the sub-national level (Ishiyama, 
2019; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kopecky et al., 2012). In authoritarian settings, in states 
experiencing violent conflict and in those that are recently post-conflict, which 
are all contexts that apply in the MENA region beyond recently democratic Tu-
nisia, substantial sources of political power are also frequently found outside of 
the formal political arena, most notably in the form of control of resources, the 
military (de facto as opposed to de jure) and armed militias, and political power 
consequently becomes tied to the issue of peace and security (Lyons, 2004; Mat-
fess, 2015; Reilly, 2002; van de Walle, 2003). Taking the different political con-
texts into consideration, political power is thus best defined here as those factors 
that affect the structure of competition, including the rules, regulations and 
processes determining who is the head of state, the head of government, who 
forms the cabinet, and how these people are (s)elected, in addition to resource 
control and issue salience at the end of the conflict, a factor which relates to vot-
er mobilization. These elements all play a central role in shaping political mod-
eration and immoderation if thought of as political space and analyzed along the 
lines of the risk-reward ratio (Ishiyama, 2019; Lijphart, 1977; Shugart & Carey, 
1992). 
If accepting that in many instances, power is mainly rooted beyond the elec-
toral arena, and thus adopting a broader view of political success as the attain-
ment and maintenance of power at the national level, there are certain related 
implications concerning existing findings on the moderation of post-rebel par-
ties in power. Namely, the factors that led to these parties winning seats in the 
legislature, are not necessarily the same factors that enable post-rebel parties to 
reach and retain power. In other words, as illustrated in Table 2 and Table 3, it 
is evident that although factors such as prior political experience, leadership 
continuity, not being a splinter party, emerging victorious from the conflict, the 
existence of sizeable, established parties, and the timing of the first post-conflict 
election explain under which conditions formerly excluded parties are statisti-
cally likely to win seats in national elections as per the study by Manning and 
Smith (2019), they do not appear to account for why some post-rebel parties 
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Table 2. Post-rebel party success: electoral and other environmental indicators. 
 RPF CNDD-FDD MPS PCT PPRD NRM ANC HDZ PDK CPN(M) FRETILIN FMLN 
Country RW BI TD CG CD UG ZA HR XK NP TL SV 
Prior political  
experience 
Y N N N/Y N N Y N N Y N Y 
Leadership  
continuity 
Y Y Y Y/Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Splinter N N N N N N N N N Y N N 
Victorious at  
conflict end 
Y Y Y Y/Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 












Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N 
Election delay 9 0 7 33/3* 3 20 0 0 2 2 3 2 
1st post-conflict  
election (leg) 
2003 2005 1997 1973/2002 2006 2006 1994 1990 2001 2008 2001 1994 
Seat share (leg)             
1st election 41.3 54.2 52.0 100 22.2 66.8 63.0 58.4 30.0 38.1 62.5 25.0 
2nd election 45.0 76.4 72.9 100 12.4 70.1 66.5 61.6 30.0 13.9 32.3 32.1 
3rd election 46.3 63.6 44.1 100 n/a 68.8 69.8 59.1 37.0 19.3 38.5 36.9 
4th election 45.0   100   66.0 30.5 34.0  35.4 36.9 
5th election    14.4C   62.3 43.7 30.8  35.4 38.1 
6th election    12.0C   57.5 43.1 19.2   41.7 
7th election    38.7    29.1 20.0   36.9 
8th election    34.3    33.8    36.9 
9th election    64.0    37.7    27.4 
10th election    59.6         
Vote share (pres)             
1st election 95.1 94.4 69.1 
- 
(1992) 
58.1 74.2 n/a 56.7 n/a 47.8 30.8 31.7 
2nd election 93.1 91.6 63.2 
89.4 
(2002) 
49.0 69.3 n/a 61.4 n/a - 38.8 29.1 
3rd election 98.8 69.4 64.7 78.6 28.8 59.3 n/a 22.5 n/a - 57.1 35.7 
4th election   88.7 60.2  68.4 n/a 34.1 n/a   51.3 
5th election   59.9   56.6 n/a 12.0 n/a   50.1 
6th election       n/a 50.7    14.4 
7th election        47.3     
Sources: Election data was retrieved from the IPUP arline and IFES databases at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp and  
http://www.electionguide.org/; 1Rival parties are defined as parties winning 10 percent or more in the previous (conflict or pre-conflict) election and also 
competing in the first post-conflict election (Manning & Smith, 2019); *Delay between end of conflict in the first instance and the holding of multi-party 
(competitive) elections; CPeriod of conflict; Bold highlights victory for post-rebel party; Grey shaded area shows indicators positively correlated with elec-
toral success according to Manning and Smith (2019); Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), Union for National Progress (UPRONA), National 
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Table 3. Political space: exclusionary behaviour in perspective. 
 RPF CNDD-FDD MPS PCT PPRD NRM ANC HDZ PDK CPN(M) FRETILIN FMLN 
Country RW BI TD CG CD UG ZA HR XK NP TL SV 
Uninterrupted  
simultaneous presidential 
power and legislative 
victory 
Y Y Y Y* Y Y Y N N N N N 
Party alternated between 
government and  
opposition 
















Y Y Y Y Y 
Did the post-rebel party 
constitute the only legal  
party in the country? 
N N N 
Y 
Pre-1992 
N N N N N N N N 
Last pre-conflict election:  
no. of parties winning 
10%+ of seats (legislature) 
1 2 0 3 1 0 3 1** 1** 2 0 2 
Parties winning 10%+  
of seats (legislature),  
incl. post-rebel party  
plus Freedom House 
classification 
            
1st election 1(0)N 3(2)P 3(2)N 1(0)P1 2(1)N 2(1)P 3(2)F 2(1)P 3(2) 3(1)P 1(0)P 3(2)PO 
2nd election 1(0)N 2(1)P 1(0)N 1(0)N 1(0)N 1(0)P 1(0)F 2(1)P 2(1)O 3(1)PO 4(2)PO 4(3)FO 
3rd election 1(0)N 2(0)N 1(0)N 1(0)N n/aN 1(0)N 2(1)F 1(0)P 4(2) 3(1)P 3(2)PO 3(2)FO 
4th election 1(0)N   1(0)N   2(1)F 4(3)FO 4(3)P  4(3)P 3(2)FO 
5th election    1(0)PC   2(1)F 2(1)F 4(3)P  2(1)FO 3(2)FO 
6th election    1(0)PC   3(2)F 2(1)F 3(2)P   3(2)F 
7th election    1(0)P2    2(1)FO 4(3)PO   3(1)F 
8th election    1(0)N    3(2)F    3(1)F 
9th election    1(0)N    2(1)F    4(2)F 
10th election    1(0)N         
Participation in coalition 
government 










Serious allegations of  
fraud, manipulation  
and/or electioneering 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
CIndicates period of conflict; OIndicates that the post-rebel party was in opposition; 11973 election; 22002 election; *Denis Sassou Nguesso was president from 
1979-1992 and again from 1997 onwards following his reinstatement with the assistance of Angolan troops. His presidency was thus interrupted for a brief 
period, but as this was a time of conflict, it has not been counted as such; **The former Yugoslavia operated with a 1-party system. The ruling party was the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which was itself a rebel movement prior to making the transition to a political party upon the fall of the monarchy 
and the liberation from foreign occupation in 1945; ***In August 2018, the country’s first coalition government was sworn in, some seven months after Felix 
Tshisekedi took over the presidency from Joseph Kabila, who stepped down to become senator for life; Number of parties in opposition to the post-rebel 
party highlighted in brackets; Grey shaded areas indicate severe restriction of political space by virtue of (engineered) post-rebel party dominance., i.e., 
exclusionary behaviour; Freedom House classification: F = free; P = partly free; N = not free; Election data retrieved from the IPUP arline and IFES data-
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For instance, our data highlights the reality that several post-rebel parties in 
sub-Saharan Africa performed exceedingly well in terms of the attainment and 
maintenance of power on a consistent basis vis-à-vis their counterparts in other 
regions, and this despite having virtually no prior political experience and the 
fact that the sub-Saharan African states were generally the ones which delayed 
the first post-conflict election the most. Furthermore, the data also shows that in 
the cases where the main issue that attracted voters to the post-rebel party dur-
ing the conflict remained salient in its aftermath, the post-rebel party—as ex-
pected—did not have to moderate in order to perform well at the polls. Howev-
er, in the cases where the post-rebel parties were forced to adapt to attract voters 
due to the lack of issue salience post-conflict, there were also signs of modera-
tion in terms of affording political space and therefore opposition parties of 
some stature. Thus, there is reason to believe that moderation with representa-
tion in mente, which is directed at the electorate, is driven by different factors to 
moderation with the aim of securing (and sustaining) political power, particu-
larly in post-conflict situations teetering on the brink of violence and in authori-
tarian contexts, where the electoral arena—which, as discussed above, extends to 
the objective of being included in the executive, and accordingly appealing to 
other parties—is often not the ultimate source of such power. Consequently, the 
arena of contestation is of crucial importance if we are to understand party 
moderation and inclusive behaviour. 
4. Arenas of Power, Problem Solving and Moderation 
The data presented in Table 3 also illustrates how amongst the 12 cases selected 
for analysis in this article, seven managed to carve out a predominant position 
for themselves within their respective political systems. These seven parties—the 
ANC in South Africa, the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, the MPS in Chad, the NRM 
in Uganda, the PCT in Congo-Brazzaville, the PPRD in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and the RPF in Rwanda, have all enjoyed simultaneous presidential 
power and legislative victory without interruption (excluding periods of violent 
unrest) for the duration of the entire post-conflict period, and have thus neither 
alternated between government and opposition, nor has there been alternation 
at the level of the presidency, save for in the case of South Africa, where there 
was a transfer of power within the ANC. This observation is noteworthy as the 
data also reveals a clear relationship between moderation and power—and pre-
dominance specifically—with the most powerful parties having restricted politi-
cal space the most compared to other post-rebel parties as hinted at above, but 
not necessarily if measured against the previous regime. In other words, the 
predominant post-rebel parties have been the least moderate, but have not nec-
essarily immoderated. In fact, in most cases, the post-rebel party has constituted 
an improvement on the previous regime, having moderated in the sense of re-
placing one-party systems void of formal opposition parties with a severely re-
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That said, it is also worth noting the nuances. Most importantly, not all pre-
dominant post-rebel parties were met with insignificant opposition from the 
outset, which was the case in point for the ANC and the CNDD-FDD, and not 
all predominant post-rebel parties in power restricted political space, with the 
ANC being the most inclusive. In other words, the existence of significant polit-
ical rivals did not prevent predominance, and predominance did not necessarily 
lead to exclusionary behaviour, i.e., in which the post-rebel party used its privi-
leged position to restrict political space and effectively eradicate the opposition 
to ensure the survival of its own regime. 
4.1. A History of Violence: Resolving Political Disagreements  
Outside the Electoral Arena 
If the twin factors of absence of weighty competition and predominance do not 
explain exclusionary behaviour of post-rebel parties in power, then what does? 
Delving into qualitative historico-political data on the 12 cases, it becomes evi-
dent that, as discussed below, the primary arena of power has significant expla-
natory power, illustrating how ideas of what are tolerable limitations on power 
and violations of democratic processes vary depending on a particular country’s 
political tradition of not only solving conflict, but also of the level of liberties. 
Hence, what constitutes an unacceptable roll-back of rights in the eyes of the ci-
tizenry (and to some extent also political rivals and the international communi-
ty) varies from one setting to another, whereas a history of violence as a means 
to solve political disagreement is clearly linked to predominant systems, either as 
a result of immoderation or simply the persistence of authoritarianism once 
post-rebel parties are in power. 
Save for the ANC, in the case of the post-rebel parties that became predomi-
nant, there was a history of violence as a means to solve political conflict in their 
respective countries dating back to the pre-independence era, combined with 
limited—or no—prior experiences with multiparty democracy and, thus, there 
was a general acceptance (albeit not unopposed) of these existing rules of the 
game. All six states had furthermore been plagued by either extensive periods of 
conflict or successive civil wars, and although the period of unrest had come to 
an end, the issue that had sustained a backing for the post-rebel party amongst 
the populace—often rooted in ethnicity and/or regionalism—remained salient 
and the risk of political violence continued to be an imminent possibility and 
furthermore also not an anomaly. 
In terms of the status of the post-rebel parties, this reality had implications for 
how they faced and tackled political rivalry at the conflict’s end and during their 
subsequent stint in power. In the case of the MPS, the NRM, the PCT, the PPRD 
and the RPF, the main battlefield was not the electoral arena, but rather outside 
formal politics. What kept these parties in power had little to do with their polit-
ical ideology, vision and behaviour. Rather, what attracted supporters amongst 
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resources and military capability. In Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Uganda 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the main post-rebel party was faced with 
limited and weak opposition from rival political parties from the outset. In the 
case of the former four, this reality was partly a consequence of the fact that the 
post-rebel party exerted virtual monopoly on power in the legislative and execu-
tive spheres right from the conflict’s end as they enjoyed immense popular sup-
port8 (Anderson & Fisher, 2016; Clark, 2008; Hansen, 2013; Makara, Rakner, & 
Svåsand, 2009; Matfess, 2015; Miles, 1995; Reyntjens, 2013; Samset & Dalby, 
2003; Tripp, 2004; Wilson, 2017)9. In all cases, including in those states with 
charismatic leadership and electorally successful parties, the chief strategy of re-
gime survival employed was nonetheless a combination of brute force and clien-
telism, a widely popular method amongst so-called weak states across the globe 
(Boggero, 2009; Hansen, 2013; Jensen & Wanchekon, 2004, de Waal, 2009; van 
de Walle, 2003).  
Initially, opposition to the regimes of the post-rebel parties was muted, to a 
large extent because the new governing parties were not viewed as rolling rights 
and liberties back, but rather expanding political space in comparison to their 
predecessors. However, as time went by and liberties were curtailed and/or 
members of the elite came to realize that their political ambitions were unlikely 
to be fulfilled, opposition grew, which in turn led to increased repression and 
escalation of violence as such matters were routinely raised outside of the formal 
political arena. The tensions were not over ideology, but rather over access to 
resources and, by extension, power, given the clientelistic nature of the state 
(Hansen, 2013; van de Walle, 2003). Opposition forces were thus not outright 
prohibited. Rather, because the post-rebel parties once in power had blurred the 
lines between state and party, private and public, what little opposition existed in 
these countries at the time of the conflict’s end thus became squeezed out as 
such forces were unable to deliver as were new parties seeking to enter the scene. 
Smaller opposition parties accordingly existed in most states, but they had no 
genuine power and it was almost unconceivable that they would ever succeed in 
becoming powerful10. The most likely candidates to rival the regime, which in all 
 
 
8It is worth highlighting that the post-rebel parties were frequently enormously popular amongst the 
electorate, and thus their often sizeable victories are usually genuine, although often boosted by re-
pression, fraud and manipulation as reflected in various election monitoring reports (Cheeseman & 
Klaas, 2018; Cheeseman, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010).  
9In the Democratic Republic of Congo, instead of relying on the strong performance of the PPRD at 
the polls, the regime was built up around the Kabilas. The PPRD was thus one instrument amongst 
others utilized by the Kabilas to remain in power, but the main mechanisms of regime survival were 
repression and patronage, including within the electoral arena, where the Kabilas enticed scores of 
smaller parties from a party landscape of several hundred into joining an alliance led by the PPRD, 
which effectively also constituted a client (Vander Weyden, 2007). Unlike the other sub-Saharan 
post-rebel parties in power, the PPRD’s situation is thus much more precarious, particularly as some 
sizeable opposition parties do exist. 
10When such parties were on the verge of challenging the post-rebel party in power, such as for in-
stance in the case of the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (Democratic Republican Move-
ment; MDR) in Rwanda, the post-rebel party moved to have its rival prohibited even in the face of 
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states was personalistic, were to be found within the post-rebel party as opposed 
to externally. 
The dynamics of power in Burundi and South Africa differed somewhat from 
those of the other five sub-Saharan states in that the ANC and the CNDD-FDD 
faced rivalry that could not be ignored at the time of the conflict’s end, but the 
shape of the competition took very different forms and so did the environment 
in which politics unfolded in the two states. Beginning with Burundi, at the end 
of the war, the CNDD-FDD was arguably the country’s main political party, 
having been the dominant rebel force during the conflict. Thus, the CNDD-FDD 
controlled the security apparatus and state resources, and despite the signing of a 
peace agreement, the distribution of power and patronage along ethnic (Hu-
tu/Tutsi) lines, i.e., the issue which had led to the eruption of the war and gar-
nered support for the post-rebel party during the period of conflict, remained 
salient. Hence, the CNDD-FDD emerged from the war in a strong position 
vis-à-vis its political opponents, yet the party was not in a position to eradicate 
its rivals on the party scene as a number of these controlled their own armed mi-
litias and had significant as well as stable roots in society, although they were 
poorly organized (Tobolka, 2014; Wittig, 2016). Consequently, the CNDD-FDD 
conceded a sizeable seat share in the legislature to opposition parties and entered 
into a power-sharing arrangement in line with the Arusha agreement, although 
the CNDD-FDD was firmly in the driving seat (Reyntjens, 1993, 2009; Wittig, 
2016)11. Five years later, at the time of the second post-conflict election in 2010, 
the CNDD-FDD had cemented its position in power, capitalizing on intra-elite 
competition and fragmentation of the party system, particularly amongst the 
Hutu segment and, some say, as a consequence of electoral fraud and manipula-
tion as the international community had become less preoccupied with Burun-
dian affairs (Reyntjens, 2006; Tobolka, 2014). Since the conflict’s end in 2005, 
the CNDD-FDD has thus gradually bolstered its reign by effectively setting up 
an extensive clientelistic network, thus creating a party-state merger, coupled 
with harsh repression of any form of opposition—whether ethnic, internal or 
external—including via the manipulation of legislation with the purpose of in-
terfering with internal party matters of its rivals (Jones & Wittig, 2016; Lemar-
chand, 2009; Tobolka, 2014; Wittig, 2016). In other words, the party used the 
 
 
11It is worth noting that in many instances, power sharing in the form of coalition government 
means very little in terms of actually sharing power. In addition to the strategy of entering into coa-
lition government, some predominant post-rebel parties have consciously reduced their seat share in 
the legislature or effectively given up the presidency as illustrated by the recent example of Joseph 
Kabila stepping down as the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Such behaviour, often 
termed “tactical moderation” (Karakaya & Yildirim, 2013) or “strategic moderation” (Schwedler, 
2011), frequently occurs in situations where the post-rebel party runs little risk when offering token 
power, but where the rewards are relatively high, such as for instance under circumstances where the 
post-rebel party has de facto monopoly on power via e.g., the presidency, command of regional 
councils, and/or control of the armed forces and police (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018). Hence, data in-
dicating a slump at the polls for the post-rebel party does not necessarily imply that the party is not 
popular or powerful, nor does power-sharing and political contestation necessarily indicate that the 
party is willing to reach compromise and accept different points of view, one of the key benchmarks 
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same regime survival techniques as its compatriots elsewhere in the region, but 
over a prolonged period of time given that at the outset it was faced with serious 
contestation, both peaceful and violent. 
Whereas in Burundi and the other sub-Saharan states the main arena of con-
testation was outside formal politics, in South Africa, the electoral arena was 
where power was anchored. Unlike the other predominant post-rebel parties in 
power, the ANC did not command a significant military force following the in-
tegration into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) of the party’s 
armed wing, the uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), in 1994. While the 
ANC as the governing party was in control of the SANDF, the army was dis-
jointed and weak, and the ANC’s real source of power consequently lay else-
where, i.e., rooted in the electorate. During the struggle against apartheid, the 
country’s racial cleavage had garnered support for the ANC, and that cleavage 
remained salient post-conflict and therefore continued to recruit supporters and 
voters for the party (Giliomee, Myburgh, & Schlemmer, 2001; Southall, 2001). 
Furthermore, opinion polls also clearly indicated that the rival parties—established 
and new—were not challenging the ANC’s predominant position as black voters 
continued to vote for the ANC, even when presented with alternatives (Gordon, 
2018; Mattes & Piombo, 2001; Seekings, 2008), whilst the minority electorate 
remained unconvinced by the party’s main rivals (Brooks, 2004; Southern, 
2011). Consequently, at the time of the country’s first post-conflict election and 
during the following decades too, the ANC never found itself in a situation 
where its position of power was significantly challenged, whether within the 
electoral arena or from outside formal politics, and the party accordingly had no 
real incentive to restrict political space from a risk-reward perspective. In 
light of the country’s history of multiparty politics, seeking to formally reduce 
the opposition (i.e., beyond harassment, which the party was certainly guilty 
of) would arguably have constituted a significant and undoubtedly controver-
sial roll-back and, furthermore, such immoderation and exclusionary beha-
viour was also unlikely to yield sizeable rewards given the party’s already 
(pre)dominant position (Giliomee, Myburgh, & Schlemmer, 2001; Southall, 
2001).  
4.2. Problem-Solving in the Electoral Arena: Authoritarian and 
Multiparty Pasts 
In the remaining five cases selected for this study, the post-rebel party secured 
government power—in most cases at the conflict’s end—but did not become 
predominant, and competition within the party systems was consequently more 
pronounced than in the seven sub-Saharan cases discussed above. This is not, 
however, to say that these five cases were necessarily more moderate in orienta-
tion. Rather, like the ANC in South Africa, the choices afforded the post-rebel 
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In Nepal and El Salvador, the CPN(M) and the FMLN were met with fierce 
competition at the polls from established rival parties, which challenged the po-
sition and power of the post-rebel party notwithstanding its victory in the con-
flict. They were thus not in a position to restrict political space, either because 
they were not strong enough to do so once in power, as in the case of the 
CPN(M) in Nepal, or because they did not gain power until several years after 
the conflict had ended, like the FMLN in El Salvador. In both cases, the 
post-rebel party was consequently pushed to change out of necessity. With re-
spect to the CPN(M), the party was forced to adapt in an effort to attract sup-
porters in the face of competition in the wake of the conflict’s end as the issue 
that had driven the party’s backing, i.e., the removal of the monarchy, was no 
longer salient with the abdication of the king in 2008 (Joshi & Mason, 2007; La-
woti & Pahari, 2010)12. The FMLNin El Salvador found itself in an even more 
challenging environment as the basis of power shifted from armed capabilities to 
the electoral arena at the end of the civil war (1979-1992). Unlike the other 
post-rebel parties in this study, the FMLN surfaced from the conflictas weak 
vis-à-vis its main political rivals, most notably the Alianza Republicana Naciona-
lista (Nationalist Republican Alliance; ARENA), which was already an estab-
lished, sizeable and highly powerful actor within the formal political system and 
beyond due to the party’s close ties to the military and various militias and, of 
course, its command of state resources qua the ARENA’s position as the ruling 
party for much of the civil war period (Stanley, 2006). Hence, in order for the 
FMLN to survive or, as a minimum, remain relevant, the party was forced to 
change with a view to bolstering its popularity amongst the Salvadorian electo-
rate (Almeida, 2009; Lehoucq, 1995; Lyons, 2010; de Zeeuw, 2010)13. 
Like the CPN(M) and the FMLN, the FRETILIN, the HDZ and the PDK were 
forced to adapt, and in the latter three cases also to moderate in order to remain 
politically relevant. In contrast to the situation in Nepal and El Salvador, in 
Croatia, East Timor and Kosovo, the conflict had centred around the issue of 
independence, and the post-rebel parties consequently emerged onto a party 
scene that resembled a blank canvas. Not in the sense that there were no estab-
lished or budding rival parties, but rather because none of the parties had con-
tested legislative elections in this new post-independence setting, and in most 
cases the parties were entirely new to electoral politics due to the authoritarian 
and/or colonial character of the previous regime. Furthermore, because the 
post-rebel parties had succeeded in their endeavours, the issue that had attracted 




12Please note that issues relating to caste, regionalism and ethnicity remained salient post-conflict. 
13The FMLN won the legislative elections of 2003, but the party did not form government as it was 
usurped by an alliance between ARENA and the PCN. In El Salvador, as illustrated in table 3, the 
head of state is also the head of government. At the time of the legislative elections of 2003, the 
president was Francisco Flores Pérez of the ARENA. From 2003/2009 onwards, the FMLN has suc-
ceeded in securing successive legislative and presidential victories, thus in turn forcing the ARENA 
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In East Timor, the FRETILIN was challenged by a great amount of contesta-
tion originating from within the party as prominent members left and the 
FRETILIN splintered—i.e., similar to the situation in Chad/MPS, Con-
go-Brazzaville/PCT, the Democratic Republic of Congo/PPRD, Rwanda/RPF 
and Uganda/NRM. Furthermore, the party suffered powerful setbacks in so far 
as it lost control of the military and police as these factionalized when the coun-
try’s regional conflict became more prominent following independence (Boyle, 
2014; Leach, 2013). In Kosovo, the PDK similarly suffered from a decline in re-
sources and military capabilities as the party adapted to independence, initially 
under international tutelage. Unlike the war-time situation, where the PDK had 
been able to rely on illicit funding sources, in the new political context the PDK 
had to take into account demands for greater accountability and transparency 
from the public as well as the international community (Manning, 2007)14. Fur-
thermore, the PDK was also forced to adapt in terms of ideology—especially 
with regard to the use of violence—upon the transition from rebel group to po-
litical party. This pressure to change was intensified by the rivalry afforded by 
the Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo; LDK), which 
had served as the main vehicle for civil disobedience during the war and there-
fore had superior roots amongst the citizenry and was also better organized, as 
well as that of the Aleancapër Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo; AAK), which like the PDK originated from within the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army (KLA) and consequently had a similar constituency (Ante, 2010; Co-
cozzelli, 2013; Manning, 2007; Taylor, 2005).  
In other words, whilst the PDK in Kosovo and the HDZ in Croatia—as dis-
cussed below—both emerged from their respective conflicts as the main 
post-rebel force, and although both states originated in the former Yugoslavia, 
which had operated with a one-party system until the federation began to disin-
tegrate in 1990, both parties faced intense competition at the polls despite party 
pluralism being relatively new. In Croatia, at the time of the first post-conflict 
(yet pre-independence) election in 1990, the HDZ faced fierce contestation from 
the Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske (Social Democratic Party of Croatia; 
SDP), i.e., the successor to the Savez Komunista Hrvatske (League of Commun-
ists of Croatia; SKH), which had governed Croatia within the Yugoslav federa-
tion since World War II (Boduszyński, 2010; Ishiyama, 2002). In light of this, the 
HDZ sought to brand itself as distinctly different to its leftist main rival. Initially, 
the party generally took a moderate stance with a view to avoid alienating voters 
and consequently sought to appeal broadly, including to voters on the left, de-
spite the HDZ’s conservative character (Haughton & Fisher, 2008). However, 
following the HDZ victory in 1990 and party leader Franjo Tuđman’s success in 
the presidential election in 1992, the new regime introduced authoritarian 
measures to eradicate the opposition, yet the party remained extremely popular 
amongst the electorate, partly because the opposition was divided and unwilling 
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to cooperate amongst itself (Bellamy, 2001; Fisher, 2006)15. That said, the HDZ’s 
authoritarian tendencies eventually became the party’s downfall as some voters 
came to see the former communist regime as liberal in comparison, and thus the 
appeal of the left intensified as did that of the centre-right parties, which came 
across as moderate vis-à-vis the HDZ, and in 2000 the HDZ was consequently 
relegated to the opposition by the electorate (Bellamy, 2001; Fisher, 2006; 
Haughton & Fisher, 2008). Keeping in mind similar situations in the predomi-
nant party systems in sub-Saharan Africa, where the roll-back of political rights 
was accompanied by harsh repression and the restriction of political space as 
discussed above, the events in Croatia are particularly noteworthy because they 
demonstrate how the HDZ found itself unable to act similarly to these other 
post-rebel parties because power was located in a different arena. Not only was 
the roll-back of liberties a red line for many voters, the attempted use of military 
force to back up such exclusionary behaviour would also have been unacceptable. 
In short, across the five cases (plus South Africa discussed above), despite the 
diverse political contexts, the reality that political power was anchored and 
therefore contested within the electoral arena meant that opposition voices were 
afforded a genuine opportunity to grow and take hold. This, in turn, resulted in 
alternation of power between different parties becoming the norm over the years 
in Croatia, East Timor, Kosovo, Nepal and El Salvador, whilst in the predomi-
nant states, including South Africa, such alternation did not take place. In the 
majority of these former states, notwithstanding the multiparty setup, this 
brought about the establishment of what can best be characterized as 2-party 
systems16, with power alternating in East Timor between the FRETILIN and its 
main rival, the Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução Timorense (National Con-
gress for Timorese Reconstruction; CNRT), between the FMLN and the ARENA 
in El Salvador, the HDZ and the SDP in Croatia, and the PDK and the LDK in 
Kosovo, whilst in Nepal competition is broader and power has consequently al-
ternated between more than two parties.  
In these five states plus South Africa, i.e., the ones that did not have a history 
of violence to resolve conflict but instead saw power anchored in the electoral 
arena coupled with various degrees of experience with multiparty politics prior 
to the eruption of their respective conflicts, this state of affairs has continued in 
the wake of the conflict’s end and the rise of the post-rebel parties to power. 
Furthermore, the ANC, the CPN(M), the FMLN, the FRETILIN, the HDZ and 
the PDK were generally more inclusive from very early on if compared to the 
MPS, the NRM, the RPF, the PCT and the PPRD as well as, eventually, the 
CNDD-FDD, and the former six parties have remained so, albeit with some os-
cillation. Interestingly, this means that the ANC, the CPN(M) and the FMLN 
 
 
15The HDZ also targeted the federal government in Belgrade as well as ethnic minorities (especially 
Serbs and Hungarians) (Haughton & Fisher, 2008). 
16Given the character of the party systems, the effective number of parties was of course higher. 
However, power rested with one of the two dominant parties, which at times included junior coali-
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have not moderated once in power if benchmarked against the previous 
(pre-conflict) regime, unlike their remaining counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa 
(even though these were less inclusive), as well as the FRETILIN, the HDZ and 
the PDK, thereby underlining the importance of addressing the issue of whether 
we are concerned with observing change, i.e., the process of moderation, or sus-
tained displays of moderate behaviour17. In either case, the analysis above has 
shown that detailed knowledge of the character of the political environment at 
the time of the entry of formerly excluded parties into formal politics, most not-
ably the structures of power, is crucial for understanding and assessing the 
prospects for moderation and moderate (inclusive) behaviour by such parties 
once in power. 
5. Environmental Constraints and the Behaviour of 
Post-Rebel Parties in Power: Implications for the  
Debate on Islamist Inclusion and Moderation 
The study of party change, whether in terms of Islamist moderation by inclusion 
or the moderation of post-rebel parties within the electoral arena, tend to focus 
on behavioural and ideological moderation from the perspective of incentives, 
i.e., risks and rewards. Within this framework, the emphasis has been on how 
parties respond to—or interact with—the electorate and the incumbent regime, 
the former in the case of those parties already allowed to partake in formal poli-
tics, and the latter with particular reference to the parties that are seeking to join. 
While such research has taught us a great deal about how formerly excluded par-
ties seek to carve out a position for themselves within pluralist electoral politics 
based on the risk-reward ratio, they shed little light on how different environ-
ments structure the opportunities offered such parties in terms of moderation 
and immoderation. In other words, these parties do not make their calculations 
suspended in thin air, but are shaped by various factors relating to the structures 
of power at the time of inclusion into the formal political system, the histori-
co-political context of the country in question, as well as the risk of violence and 
insecurity. Offered no such limitations on their power, most parties would be-
come predominant and exclusionary; what prevents this situation from materia-
lizing across the globe is the reality that most parties are faced with some limita-
tions, albeit to varying degrees, which in turn explains the different trajectories 
of post-rebel parties in power. This is a novel angel in the study of formerly ex-
cluded parties. 
The article has put forward the argument that the historico-political environ-
 
 
17It is worth highlighting that if judged against the post-rebel party’s behaviour at the time of gaining 
power until the present day, this article covers examples that appear to have been moderate from the 
outset (i.e., from the first post-conflict election), such as e.g., the PDK in Kosovo and El Salvador’s 
FMLN, or have moderated over time in the sense of becoming politically inclusive, one example be-
ing the FRETILIN in East Timor. The study also includes post-rebel parties that gained power and 
which were never moderate and have either remained so (e.g., Rwanda’s RPF and the PCT in 
Congo-Brazzaville) or have experienced backsliding, that is, turning exclusionary once in power, 
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ment profoundly shapes the structures of opportunity of formerly excluded par-
ties once in power. That is, the environment largely determines whether a 
post-rebel party or, indeed, an Islamist party in power is likely to deem modera-
tion the most rewarding or least costly option to maintain their power or 
whether immoderation or the status quo are better options from a cost-benefit 
perspective. Furthermore, the article has discussed several factors that appear to 
influence whether a post-rebel party is likely to behave in an exclusionary fa-
shion, including the character of the political opposition (parties), issue salience, 
a history of multiparty politics and a tradition of violence to solve conflict. In 
terms of the 12 post-rebel parties studied here, the qualitative analysis found that 
the main arena in which power is located and contested, i.e., the electoral arena 
or outside of formal politics, ultimately shapes how previously excluded parties 
behave once in power, which is a significant finding for not only the study of 
post-rebel parties, but also other (formerly) excluded parties, such as e.g., Islam-
ist parties. In terms of those parties which were located within systems where the 
main arena of contestation was the electoral arena, a post-rebel party’s ability to 
curb political space once in power was limited by the presence of weighty oppo-
sition parties at the time of the first post-conflict election, the expectation 
amongst the electorate that liberties would not be rolled back, and the tacit 
agreement that democratic procedures—including elections—are the means to 
resolve disagreements. 
The above aligns with the theory put forward by Panebianco (1988) that suc-
cessful parties adapt to their context or adapt their context to themselves in the 
sense that post-rebel parties entering systems where the electoral arena was the 
main source of power, even if the previous regime was authoritarian and/or co-
lonial exclusionary such as in the cases of the HDZ in Croatia, the FRETILIN in 
East Timor and the PDK in Kosovo, maintain this state of affairs once in power. 
Furthermore, the analysis also shows that post-rebel parties arriving at power in 
political systems where political power is mainly anchored outside of the elec-
toral arena, i.e., in clientelism and the use of force, eventually come to rely on 
such methods to maintain power if not already doing so at the outset, such as for 
instance in the case of Burundi’s CNDD-FDD. 
If the analysis of the 12 formerly excluded post-rebel parties here is anything 
to go by, whether Islamist parties are going to behave moderately—in an inclu-
sive fashion—and also moderate once in power has less to do with ideological 
positions and incentives at the level of the party and much more to do with the 
political system and power more broadly, i.e., at the level of the political envi-
ronment. In other words, this study finds that the issue is not one of how to push 
such parties ideologically closer towards the centre (Schwedler, 2013), because 
ideology is secondary in terms of structuring the options available to these par-
ties once in power18. This finding has significant implications for the debate on 
 
 
18The 12 post-rebel cases included leftist parties, centrist parties, right wing parties, nationalist par-
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Islamist parties and the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, because it underlines 
the need for change; to look beyond the current focus on inclusion into pluralist 
systems, as pluralism in itself is a poor predictor of moderate behaviour and 
moderation, as well as calling for scholars to look beyond the issue of Islamist 
actors and their risk calculations. In short, scholars ought to query how much is 
actually up to these Islamist parties in terms of room for change. If parties adapt 
to their context, are we expecting too much of the Islamist parties, which have 
not yet been proved immoderate? And are we not expecting enough of the in-
cumbent regimes, which have a clear track-record of exclusionary behaviour, 
i.e., restricting political space? The majority of Islamist parties seeking to be-
come integrated into the formal political system of their respective countries and 
operate and contest national elections on an equal footing with other political 
parties are attempting to gain entry into competitive authoritarian systems 
where, in most cases, power is located outside of the electoral arena, whether 
with the military, a non-elected head of state, or a head of state who was 
(s)elected in elections that were neither free, fair nor genuinely competitive. By 
virtue of these regimes’ restriction of the party landscape, most notably by the 
exclusion of Islamist parties—whether all or just some—the incumbent regimes 
are necessarily immoderate. Furthermore, the Islamist parties are not all radical, 
but in many instances simply constitute the main opposition force rivalling the 
incumbent regime, thereby earning them their radical label, although many 
would be better described as rebel parties in their quest for inclusion and, ulti-
mately, power. 
With the analysis conducted here in mind, it seems fair to assume that the Is-
lamist parties afforded inclusion into the formal political system in their respec-
tive countries will adapt to the structures of power already in place. They are un-
likely to immoderate (which none of the 12 cases in this study did) and reverse 
what Schwedler (2013) once optimistically characterized as democratic open-
ings, but they are also unlikely to switch the main arena of contestation from 
outside of formal politics to the electoral arena on their own accord, not only 
due to the fact that they will have adapted to the way of conducting politics un-
der competitive authoritarianism by the time they arrive in power (as they are 
predicted to do if allowed to contest freely), but also because such a seismic shift 
takes a so-called democratic moment on par with the Arab Uprisings, which 
failed to produce such monumental change. What we can thus expect from the 
inclusion of Islamist parties into formal politics in the competitive authoritarian 
states of the MENA is for these parties to uphold the status quo, that is, to the 
extent that these parties will be in a position to make such decisions given that 
power often does not lie with the political parties and the country’s elected rep-
resentatives. Hence, in comparison to the 12 post-rebel parties analyzed here, the 
Islamist hopefuls have much less room for manoeuvre because of the nature of 
the political environment, and their inclusion consequently ought to be less 




DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2020.104038 660 Open Journal of Political Science 
 
afield. The formerly excluded Islamist parties are, in other words, in a position 
of strength given their (anticipated) popularity amongst the electorate, but si-
multaneously many will find themselves in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the 
military and/or head of state.  
In countries where alternation of power is a genuine possibility, such as for 
instance in Tunisia and Turkey, where Islamist parties are already participating, 
the best bulwark against immoderation once in power, which is arguably rare, 
would have been to improve upon the democratic credentials of the regime prior 
to the inclusion of these parties because, as discussed above, the electorate and 
rival parties rarely accept a roll-back of political rights and civil liberties unless 
backed up with considerable force. In other words, anchoring power in the elec-
toral arena, fostering several strong political parties with popular roots as well as 
genuinely affording alternation of power at the polls—these are all factors that 
appear to be conducive of moderate behaviour and moderation according to the 
findings of this study. This point is not unlike that made by Schwedler (2013: p. 
5), who argues that “when institutions are in flux or when institutional checks 
are not well established to prevent a single-party takeover, the underlying com-
mitments of political actors become extremely relevant”, but the approach to the 
issue is fundamentally dissimilar. Where Schwedler (2011, 2013) and other pro-
ponents of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis focus on Islamist party change 
as paramount, this study emphasizes change to the authoritarian political con-
text as a priority, most notably anchoring power in the electoral arena. While 
this is arguably too late in the cases of Tunisia and Turkey, it is something to 
bear in mind in other states, most notably those that will have to build new in-
stitutions post-conflict, such as e.g., Libya and Syria, in those where the military 
will one day have to hand power back to a civilian regime (i.e., in Egypt), and in 
the executive monarchies (especially Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco), where polit-
ical parties or so-called proto-parties exist, yet democratic political reforms re-
lating to the distribution of power are long overdue. To avoid immoderation, the 
political environment at the time of entry of the Islamist parties into formal poli-
tics ought to be such that predominance is almost impossible, because as Man-
ning and Smith (2019) and Kirdiş (2018) underline, parties will only moderate 
out of necessity, and predominant parties rarely find themselves in such need.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This article has taken an innovative approach to the discussion and analysis of 
the perspectives for the moderation of Islamist political parties upon their inclu-
sion into formal politics. Anchoring the rigorous analysis in the literature on 
post-rebel parties, which shows that such formerly excluded parties, which often 
enter formal politics from a position of strength, only rarely immoderate. In fact, 
post-rebel parties tend to adapt to the political environment, with parties enter-
ing systems with a history of violence as a means to solve disagreements likely to 
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solved within the electoral arena tend to maintain this strategy. These findings 
have significant implications for the study of Islamist parties entering formal 
politics, usually in competitive authoritarian settings. Consequently, the article 
argues that a shift in focus—from the individual Islamist parties to the environ-
ment—is essential if scholars are to accurately assess and predict the conse-
quences and opportunities of Islamist inclusion, whether in terms of moderation 
and immoderation at the level of the party and/or the political system more 
broadly. From a policy perspective, particularly with democratization in mind, 
the question then becomes one of how best to create an environment that facili-
tates Islamist moderation upon their inclusion, rather than a question of wheth-
er the entry of such parties into the system is desirable at all, especially given the 
authoritarian nature of the incumbent regimes. 
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